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ESCALATING COMMITMENT TO FAILING FINANCIAL DECISIONS: WHY DOES IT
OCCUR?
John Morgan, Winona State U niversity
James Hansen, Minnesota State University-Moorh ead
Research indicates inappropriate escalation of commitment to apparently failing decisions occurs in m any
areas of life. Examples include doubling-up blackjack bets to recover losses, th e too lengthy Vietn am Wa r
cial finan
in vestments long after they appear to be failing.
debacle, and the tendency to continue with
What motivates such behavior? Two theories preselltly compete as major e.\:p/auations for this behavior:
the self-justification the01y and th e prospect th e01
y . This paper compares the two theories to determine
which the01y better predicts escalation behaviors within au uu-confouuded and unam biguous comext.
The research is motivated by th e belief that understanding why people escalate is prerequisite to
successfully developing strategies for mitigating the damages of escalation. Results show, that after
removing the confounding effects offraming differences across conditions, prospect th eory better predicts
y within th e context tested.
escalation than does self-justification th e01
dissonance that accompa nies personal fai lure. Staw
in ferred the escalation behaviors he observed in hi s 1976
expenmen t
resulted
from thi s
self-justification
phenomenon. Staw's inference (i.e. escalation resu lts
fro m self-j ustification/ego-defense) has been widely
accepted by others, and is still co mmonl y cited in
escalati on li terature. The esca lation tendencies first
observed by Staw are we ll doc umented and have been
extended in experiments by Staw and Fox ( 1977),
Caldwell and O 'Re ill y ( 1982). Davis and Bobko ( 1986).
Brockn er ( 1992), Bee ler and Hunton ( 1997). Ge iger,
Robin on, and lrwi n ( 1998), and Cheng, Schul z. Luckett,
an d Booth (2003) .
However, there is a second co mpetin g exp lanati on for
esca lati nn behav iors which has al so gai ned wide
acce ptance in esca lation literature. T hi expl ana ti on,
known as prospect theo1y (Kahnema n and Tversk:y,
1979), altii butes different reasons for escalation
behav iors . Prospect th eory says that dec ision-makers
natL!ra ll y select and utili ze di fferent decision utili ty
function s depending on their cunent state of wealth
rela tive to an initial state of wea lth. According to
prospect theory, dec ision makers are naturally riskseeking when ma king deci sions that ma y recover losses
to an ini ti al wealth state and wi ll take more risk:, than
norma l to att empt thi s. Prospect theory be lieves th is is a
widespread and na tural hum an tende ncy and is not
dependent upon persona l ego in vo lvement for efficacy in
pred icti ng behavior.
Add itionall y, when making decision s to preserve an
in iti al wealth state (or to protect gai ns to an initial wealth
state). prospec t the01y says dec ision-makers are naturall y

INTROD UCTION
It has lon g been kn ovm th at fi nancial managers
sometimes utili ze accounting an d fi nancial information in
less than optimal ways, and as a res ult, make poor
financi al decisions. One area of sub-optimal dec ision
making has been the observed tendency to esca late
commitment to failin g fin ancial choices even though
accounting and fin ancial in fo m1ation suggest it may be
time to abandon the in vestment. Users of fi nancia l
information are we ll served by understandin g what is
k:novvn about the ca uses of esca lat ion since it is a starti ng
point in developing strateg ies to avoid the sometimes
di sastrous consequences of in ap propri ate escalati on .
Staw reported the earli est emp irica l ev idence of
escalating commitment to fa iI in g fin anc ial dec isions
(Staw, 1976) . Staw noted that ind iv idu als with hi gh
personal responsibili ty for ea rli er and apparentl y fail ing
financial deci sions di spl ayed more commitmen t to them
than others havin g littl e or no personal respo nsibili ty for
in
the relati ve ly higher
the earli er dec isions. Staw fened
commitment to fa iling deci sions by hi gh responsibil ity
decision-makers resulted fro m se!f-jusrificorion In
accordance with Aronson's self-j ustifica ti on th eory
(Aronson, 1976, 1968). Aron son 's self-j ustifi cation
theory itself wa s an extension of Festin ger's we ll
establi shed and wid ely accep ted d issonance theo ry
(Festinger, 195 7).
Self-justifi ca tion theo ry says people fee l threa tened by
their mi stakes and are reluctant to admi t mi stakes even to
themse lves. Se lf-j usti fi cati on ays the re luctance to
recogn ize personal mi stakes protects the ego from the
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risk averse and demon strate reluctance to take ri sks that
jeopardizes initi a l w ea lth . Put another way, in the domain
of wea lth preservation peopl e are naturall y ri sk averse,
but in the domain of recoverin g losses to initial wea lth,
they are naturall y ri sk seekin g. T hese diffe ring dec isio n
uti lities, accord ing to prospect theory, are natural and
descriptive and do not req uire persona l ego in vo lvement
in earli er dec isions.
Prospect theory predi ction s are we ll doc umented .
E mpirical tests in a va ri ety of contexts show the ir
acc uracy inc ludin g Kahneman a nd Tversky ( 1979, 1984) ,
Tversky and Kahneman ( 198 1, 1986) , Northcraft and
Neale ( 1986) , Garl and ( 1990) , Sc haubroec k and Davi s
( 1994), John stone (2002) , Moreno, Kidda , and Smith
(2002), and C ha ng, Yen , and Duh (2002).
There is a thi rd less accepted theory of esca lati o n
ca lled sunk cost theory . Su nk cost theo ry pos its
esca lation is a fom1 of pers istence in deci s ion-making,
which may be a cri ti ca l c lement of success in bu sin ess in
th e long-run even if res ultin g in suboptim al s hort run
deci sion s (Fox , S ha ul , H offma n, and Michae l, 2002).
Wl1ile thi s lin e of rea so nin g is interestin g, it does not
serve th e present resea rch goa l of pittin g self-justi fication
theory again st prospect theory, and therefore is not
developed futi her here or incorporated into the re ea rc h
des ign of thi paper .
Bazerman wa s perhaps the first to sugges t prospect
theory is an a ltemate explanation for esca lation behaviors
(Bazem1an, 1984 ). Whyte developed spec ifi c argu men ts
detai lin g ho w prospect th eo ry ex plain s th e parti c ular
esca lation beha viors obse rved by Staw in 1976 w ithin th e
contex t of th e A & S Financial Dec is ion Case used by
Staw in that ex perimen t (Whyte. 19 6, 1993). Wh yte
furt her point , out prospect theory is a more parsimoniou s
exp lanation of esca lation , and th erefore, pre fe rabl e.
In Whyte's view ofescai::I ti on. the behav iors obse rve d
by Staw were a natura l res ult o f decision-m::~kers having
selected different dec ision utiliti es because one g ro up
framed deci s ions as recove rin g lo sses (i .e . were ri sk
seekin g) and th e other gr o up fram ed deci s ion s as
preservin g wea lth (i.e. were r isk ave rse). More
spec ificall y, high respon s ibilit y s ubjec ts escala ted , not
because of persona l ego in vo lve ment , but beca use they
viewed their dec is ion as at tempt in g to recover lo ses
from th e initi a l wea lth sta te ex istin g w hen they m::~d e
their ea r!J er dec is ion. Thu s. they we re na tura
y ll ri skseek in g in a tt e mptin g to recover th e ir l o ~scs. O n the o th er
han d, lo w persona l re spon s ibilit y s ubjec ts framed the ir
dec is ion s as prese rvi ng an initial wc::~ lth state exi sting at
y na ll in vo lved
the point th ese s ubjec ts fi rst became pe rso
in th e A & S Fina nc ia l Dec is ion Ca se, the point of th e
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second dec ision. In order to preserve their initial wealth
they were naturall y ri sk averse . According to Wllyte, ego
defense is not needed to explain the observed escalation
beha viors. D ec ision fra ming differences explains it.
Chang, H o, and Lin , reviewed esca lation literature and
point out that both sel f-j usti fication theory and prospect
theory continue as majo r explanations for escalation
(Chang, H o, and Lin , 2002). Both theories are c ited as
continuin g ac tive resea rch strea ms.
It is inte resti ng to note that no emp irical evidence was
presented by Wllyte in 1986 o r 1993 to support his
theoreti ca l arguments in support of prospect theory.
Furthem1ore, to date no unambi guous e mpirical evidence
has been reported in academi c literature that directly and
unambi guo us ly contrasts the two theori es after removing
the confounding effec ts of frami ng differences across
groups. T he purpose of this research is to do just that. We
test prospec t theory predictions agai n t self-ju stification
predi ctio n within the context of Staw 's origi na l A & S
Fina ncia l Dec ision Case after re moving fram in g
d iffe rences. \' ..: ask, w hat are th e pattem s of esca lation
between high personal respo ns ibility and low personal
respon s ibility subjects (with negative feedback) if
deci s ion fram in g differences acros the two groups have
been removed. Se lf- justi fica ti on theory and prospect
theory make very different pred ic tion a bout outcomes
under these cond iti on
If se lf-j ustifi cati o n is the so le
reason for esca lating co mmitment, then hi gh personal
responsibili ty dec ision-makers wi ll esca late mo re than
low respon sib il ity deci si on- makers to se lf-ju stify the ir
pa st ac tion s . O n th e o th er hand , if prospect theory a lone
exp la in s esca la ti on , hi gh perso na l re pons ibility subj ec ts
and low re po ns ibiliry subjects who ha ve framed
deci s io n similarl y as recove rin g losses wi ll make similar
deci s io ns beca use both gro ups have se lected and used the
sa me deci s ion utili ty fun cti o n in their decision s. A thjrd
poss ibi lit y th at is cons id e red is that both se lf-just ifi cation
and prospect theory ma y be independent sources of
e s ca l ::~tio n be havior.

Hypothesis Development
In thi s section th e method s and hypotheses fo r testin g
W hyte's a nd Staw 's sepa rate theori es for esca latin g
co mmitment arc di sc ussed. To test the differin g
are
esca la tion th eori es, two inde pendent variab le
rBILITY
(either hi gh or low
manipul ated: RES PONS
pe rsona l respon s ibility for an earli er dec ision ) and
1:EEDBACK (ei th er nega ti ve o r pos iti ve feedback with
respec t to th at ea rl ier dec is io n) . The e are the same two
va ri ab les ma nipul ated by S taw in hi s 1976 A & S
Fin ancia l Deci s io n Ca se. Furthe m1ore, we have used the
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respons ibility subj ects it is stTOn g suppoti for se lfjustificati on th eo ry. O n the other hand , if hi gh personal
respons ibili ty subj ects do not escal ate more than low
res pons ibili ty subj ects when framin g di ffere nces are
removed, th en se l f-j usti fi ca ti on theory is apparentl y not a
viabl e explanation for esca lation a fter framin g d iffe rences
are removed .
To strengthen the moti va ti on of subj ec ts to give their
best efforts in completing th e expanded A & S Financial
Dec ision Case, all subj ects were to ld they cou ld earn up
to ten extra credit poin ts for co mpletin g the dec ision ca se
accord in g to the fo ll ow in g gui de lines: 10 extTa-credit
poi nts for submitting top qu artil e so luti ons, 8 extra-cred it
points for second quarti le so luti ons, 6 extra-c red it points
for third quartil e, and 4 extra-cred it po ints for foutih
quartil e so lu tions. A ll subj ects we re told the extra-credit
points were eam ed at a team leve l. At the end of the
expetiment, everyone in fact received 10 extra-credi t
points for parti c ipating, and in rea li ty there were no team s
though thi s was not kn own until after comp leting the
case.
It sho uld be noted Wl1yte's prospect theory analysi s of
the Staw result covered on ly nega ti ve feedback
conditi ons. Positi ve feedbac k condi tions were inelevant
to expla inin g why peop le esca late and therefore were no t
in clu ded. Nevertheless, prospect th eory wo ul d predic t
hi gh and low respo ns ibi li ty subj ec ts rece ivin g pos iti ve
feedback wo uld perce ive th emselves to be in th e domain
o [ preservin g wea lth or preserv in g ga ins to wea lth. l n
bo th cases these subj ects wo uld be ri sk-averse acco rdin g
to pros pect theory. O n the other hand, subj ects receivin g
nega ti ve feedback fa ll into two d iffe rent ca tegories in
term s of framin g ex pec tati ons: those recoverin g losses to
an initi al wea lth state (ri sk-seekin g tea mma te s ubj ects)
and th ose ma inta in ing an initi a l wea lth state (risk-averse
former v ice pres id ent subj ects). Tab le l s ummari zes our
ex pectati o ns abo ut dec is ion framing and decision ut ilities
in the s ix ex perimental cond itio ns.

same exact case facts as used by Staw in the A & S
Financial Decision Case. The difference between o ur
experiment and the 1976 Staw experiment relates only to
its expanded design which includes not one, but two sets
of low responsibility subj ects. T he add iti onal set of low
responsibility subj ects is intentionally induced to fram e
the continuing investment dec ision as recovering losses,
similar to high responsibili ty subj ects, thus eliminating
the confound of framin g differences across groups.
Thi s design change deserves further ela borati on. One
set of low responsibili ty subj ects are to ld an earli er
investment deci sion has been made by a fo rmer vice
president (i .e. former vice pres id ent conditi on) . Thi s
condition exactly replicates Staw 's low respon sibili ty
condition. A second set of low respon sibility subjects are
established who are induced to be li eve the ea rli er
investment decision was mad e, not by a former vicepresident, but by their teammate in a ca se competiti on
being completed in two person teams (i.e . tea mm ate
condition) . Subjects in thi s condition (a nd all conditi ons)
are told the A & S F inancia l Dec ision Case is bein g
completed in t\vo person teams and results are to be
evaluated at the team leve l. Th e negative feedback they
receive about their teammate 's in vestment dec ision
affects their tea m standin g. T he des ign add iti on is
entirely for the purpose of creati ng a set of low persona l
responsibility subj ects who believe they are recoverin g
losses (albeit tea m losses) to an initial tea m wea lth
state.
By including low respon sibili ty s ubjects who fra me
simil arly to hi gh respons ibility subj ects (i .e. recoverin g
losses), we can directly and un ambi guo us ly test w heth er
hi gh personal responsibility subj ects esca late more than
low personal responsibili ty subj ects for reasons o f selfjustification. If both groups have framed in the same way ,
framing di ffe rences ca nn ot ex pl a in the esca lation and do
not confound the res ult. If, und er these condition s, hi gh
personal respon sibili ty subj ects esca late more th an lovv

Table 1: Prospect Theory - Summ ary of Fra min g E ffect s
Positive Feedba c k

Negative Feedback

High Respons ibility
Frame: Preserving gain s
and risk ave rse
Esca late? No
Frame: Recovering losses
and ris k seek1n g
Esca lat e"? Yes

(Fo rm er V I') L ow sRcs
ibilitv
pon
Frame: Pre:-.crvinwealth
g Jlli{Ja!
and n sk 3\' Cr ::,c
Esca lat e? NL1
Frame: Presc..:r
gv 1n C3lth
111it1al \\
and n sk averse
Esca lalt"? No

g~lln
and::,

nsh

:l\'LTsC

Fra m e: Rcco\ cnng ln.-.scs
mgand..,cd
nsh.

Esca la l<'"?

..

Vc,

theo ry pred icts no c sca l ~1l i o n by lo\\' respon s ibility
subjects w ith negative feedback s ince I O\\' respon s ibility
subj ec ts by definiti on have no pe rso nal res pon s ibi lity lor
the past dec isions . Prospec t theo ry on th t.: other hand

The lower ri ght-hand ce ll in tab le
contain s an
important and testab le predi ction wh ich in fom1s our
desire to contra st the effi cac ies of se lf-justifi cati on and
pro spect theory in predi ctin g escalation. Se lf-j ustifi ca ti on
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predicts these pa ti ic ul ar low respo ns ibility s ubj ects wi ll
be ri sk eeking to recover team losses and w ill esca late.
Hy poth es is 1 compares hi g h responsibili ty and low
respon s ibility-former vice pres id ent subjects exactl y as
S taw did in 1976 .

conditi o ns of negative feedback. Accordingly, we predict
the reappearance an interaction in these two groups and
in the sa me direction as before du e to framin g differences
a lo ne.

H ypothesis 3: There will be a significant
interaction between RESPONSIBILITY and
FEEDBACK
w hen
comparing
low
respon sibility-anony mou s teammate subjects
with low respo nsibility -fom1er vice president
s ubjects. T he direction of the interaction will be
low
responsibility-anonymous
teammate
s ubjects esca late more than low responsibilityfom1er vice pres ident s ubj ec ts in the negative
fe edback cond iti on.

H ypoth esis 1: T here wi ll be a s ignifica nt
interaction between RESPONSIBILITY and
FEEDBACK
w he n
compari ng
hi gh
respon sibility subjects w ith low respons ibilityforme r vice president subjects. T he direction of
the interaction wi ll be high respon s ibili ty
subjects esca late more than low responsibili tyfanner vice pres ident subj ec ts in the nega tive
feedback co nditi on on ly .
If confinned , H ypoth es is 1 re p licates Staw 's mai n
1976 finding in the present ex perimental context and w ith
th e present set of subj ec ts and in struc tion s involv ing
tea mmate .
Our second hypo th esis (the main hypothes is) contra sts
Whyte's fra min g predi c ti o ns wit h Staw 's se lfjusti fication predict io ns afte r re movin g the potentia l
confound of fram in g differences across groups. High
respons ibili ty
s ubj ec ts
a re
co mpared
to
low
respon s ibility-teammate subjects, both who are fra min g
to recove r losses. T he res ults of H ypo thes is 2 infonn the
main ques ti o n of thi s experim ent. Do hi g h and low
re pon ibility s ubj ects w ho have fra med in a sim ilar ri sk
seeking way demon strate s ignifi ca ntl y diffe re nt levels of
con tinuing co mmitme nt to ear lier dec is ion after negative
feedback due to se lf-j ustifica ti on of pa st action s?
Hypothes is 2 ass ume s that pros pec t theory is cotTcct and
no esca lation w ill occ ur after fram in g differences are
removed .

Hypothesis 2: There w ill not be a s ignificant
interaction between RESPONS IBILITY and
FEEDBACK for hi gh respo ns ibili ty subj ec ts
and low re spon sibili ty-a nonymo us teamma te
s ubject s.
Our third ami fina l hypothes is pro vid es o ne add iti ona l
te st of prospec t theory. Since low respo nsibilityteammate subjects a re ex pec ted to fra me in terms of
recove ring losses to an initial tea m wea lth sta te, and wi ll
th e refo re be ris k-see king , a nd s ince low respons ibilityformer ,·icc pres ide nt s ubj ec ts are be li eved to fram e in
te rms of ma mta inm g a n initi a l wea lth stale , and w ill
be ri s k-averse, it fo ll ows the two low
therefo
respo ns ibi lity groups wi ll ha ve d iffe rin g leve ls of
co nttnuing com mitment to past dec is io ns unde r

https://scholars.fhsu.edu/jbl/vol2/iss1/6

Shou ld Hypothes is I prove true, this experiment
replicates Staw ' s ma in 1976 finding of escalation using
different subj ects. Sho uld hyp o thesis 2 (the main
hypoth es is) prove tTue, and esca lation behaviors
di sappear afte r re movin g frami ng differences across
condition s, it ca ll s into questi on se lf-justification as an
ex pl anation for wha t has been ob erved, but supports a
prospec t th eory and fram in g ex plan ation. Finally, if
Hypoth es is 3 proves true, the o nl y explanation for
esca lat ion differences between two low respon sibi lity
groups is prospect theory a nd fram in g differences. Selfjustifi ca tion ca nn ot ex plain esca latio n by subj ects who
have no earli e r persona l respo nsib i Iit y for past decisions.

Ex perim ental Desig n
A ll hypotheses are tested u in g the deci sion facts of
Staw's 1976 A & S F in a nc ia l Deci s io n Case. Independent
variab les ma nipul a ted are RESPONSffilLITY --hi gh or
low respon sibili ty (b ut w ith two types of low
respon s ibi lity) , and FEEDBA C K--positi ve or nega tive
feed back. A ll subj ects were given the sa me in struction s
and led to believe the case was being so lved in two
pe rson tea ms. High res pon sibili ty subjects were given the
first half of the A & S Fi nancia l Decis ion Case and
requested to se lec t o ne of two corporate di vis ions,
consumer o r industri a l, to rece ive a ll o f a I 0 milli o n
do ll a r resea rc h a ll ocation . After makin g the decision,
hi g h respo ns ibili ty s ubj ec ts were provided pos iti ve or
nega tive feedback , a nd then req uired to make a second
dec is ion in w hi c h they a ll ocated anoth er 20 milli on
resea rc h dollars a ll o r in part to e ither of th e two
recorporate div is ion s.
Low res ponsibility-former vice president subjects
bega n the deci s io n ca se by read in g abo ut a fo m1er vice
pres ide nt w ho made a I 0 mi II io n dollar researc h
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allocation to one of two corporate divi s ions, consumer or
industrial, based on the same facts made avai lab le to hi gh
responsibility subj ec ts. Next, feedback positive or
negative was then provided. The key difference be tvveen
this group and the high respon sibi li ty group was that a
former vice president made the first deci sion rather than
subjects,
themselves.
At
thi s
point,
low
responsibility-former vice president subjects were asked
to allocate another 20 million research dollars a ll or in
part to either of the two corporate divi sion s.
Low responsibility-teammate subjects were given
the same facts and feedback as the low respo nsibili tyformer vice pres ident condition except they were to ld
their teammate in the case competiti on had made the
initial 10 million dollar research deci sion (not an
unlmown former vice president) . After receivi ng positive
or negative feedback about the teammate 's deci s ion , low
responsibility-teammate subj ects were asked to make a
second 20 million dollar resea rch a ll ocation as in the
other conditions.
The dependent variable for a ll six condition s was the
amount in dollars of the 20 million all ocated to the
divi sion selected in the first deci sion ( i.e. a measure of
the leve l of continuin g commitme nt to an ea rli er
deci s ion) . The experi mental approach for testin g all three
hypotheses was three fully randomi zed 2 X 2 factori a ls.
Three- hundred-eighty-four undergraduate stud ents
recruited fro m multiple section s of sophomo re/junior
level business classes at three mid-weste m univers iti es
served as subj ects. Subj ects were randoml y ass igned to
one of six condition s at the three sites and res ults were
collapsed across ca mpuses for fina l a nalyses . Two
hundred and twelve subjects were mal e; one hundred and
seventy-two were female. The mean age of subj ects was
20.8 years. No subjects from any s ite were debri efed
until data had been fully co ll ected at a ll locations. Th e
experiment itself wa s conducted durin g th e first twe ntyfive minutes of regular c la ss period s.

Likert sca le immediatel y after the experime nt it se lf
had
bee n conc lu ded and dec isions had been
co ll ected .
Se l f-j usti fi cation theory a nd prospec t th eory both
de pend o n subjects bein g abl e to di stin gu ish pos iti ve
from nega tive feedba ck. Res ults of o ur manipul ation
check show subj ects in positi ve feedback cond ition s did
perce ive feedbac k to be more positi ve (mean = 5.31) than
subj ects in the negat ive feedba c k conditi on s (mean =
2.59) (t = 15.76, p-va lue = .0001). The feedback
m anipul ation ap pears successful.
Subj ects were also asked to describe th eir perceptions
abo ut the leve l of persona l responsibi li ty th ey had for the
first resea rch a ll ocation dec ision . It is important to be
sure that low respons ibili ty- fo rm er vice president
subj ec ts and low respons ibilit y-tea mmate subjects both
percei ved low persona l responsibili ty fo r th e earli er
dec is ion re lative to high responsibi li ty subj ects. l f thi s
were not the case, feelin gs of in a ppropr iate hi gh personal
respon s ibili ty by low responsibi lity subjects may ha ve
confounded results and thereby di sa ll owed rulin g out
se lf-ju stifi cation as the cau se for esca la tio n. Results of
our man ipul ati o n c hec k show hi gh respon s ibility subjects
did perce ive s igni fican tl y hi gher per ona l respons ibili ty
for the first dec ision (mean = 5 .27) th an e itb er of the tw o
low respon s ibili ty gro ups-- low responsibil ity -fo rmer vice
president (mean
1.70) and low responsibilityano nymou s tea mmate (mean = 1.50) (t = 18. 96) , p- va1ue
= .000 1 and (t = 20.87), p-va lue = .000 1 respectivel y).
Subjects in a ll six cond it ion s appea r to ha\·e perceived
the ir leve l of personal respon s ib ili ty for first deci sion as
inte nd ed .
La stl y. s ubjects in th e teamma te condition were
requ ested to self-report th e degree to whi c h they
pe rce ived the ir con tinuin g dec is ions ha d been infl uenced
in any way by concern s abou t the op ini ons, feelings, or
se nse of socia l ob liga tion to bac k up their un known
teammate ' s ear li er dec ision. S ubjec ts reported a very low
leve l of concem abou t obligation s to support the ir
teamma te 's dec isio ns with a mean core or 1.52 on a
sca le of se e n. Thi s reduces th e plaus ibil it: of a con fo und
re la ted to
tea m dynamic s all ect111g continu ing
commitment and thereb y confo undin g res ulh in some
unkn o\\'n wa y.

Manipulation Checks
Manipulation c hecks were conduc ted to better
understand the success of several critical aspects of the
experi ment ' s manipulation s. These in clu ded subj ec ts '
perce pti ons about feedbac k ty pe, perce ption s about leve l
of personal respon s ibili ty for the first dec is ion , and
perception s in the low respon sibility tea mmate co nditi on
abo ut the need to support the tea mmat e' s dec ision.
Subjects se lf- reported each of these on a seve n-point
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Tabl e 2: Mean Escalation in Millions, STD. DEY., and Sa mple by Condition
lligh Respon
sibilit y
MEAN
;
8.34, S.D.; 4 16, n ; 64

Tab les 3, 4, and 5 pre ·ent resul ts of the three full y
randomi zed 2 X 2 factorial analyses of va ri ance testin g

for the pattern s or behav ior predicted by the three
hypo these

Table 3: Hig h Res pon sibility S ubj ects with Low Responsibility-Former VP S ubj ects

(Note: thi s is th e ori gin al 1976 Staw des ign)
Summary Analysis or Varian ce (2 X 2 Factoria l) n = 256
So ur
·cc
Responsibilit y
Feedba c k
Two \ Vay Int er-act io n
Residua l
Tota l

ss

OF

I06.993
353.67 5
11 0 38 1
426 1421

I
I
I
252
255

----

In tab le 3, hypoth es is l is confirmed and esca lation
ha s occ un·ed between hi gh respons ibi lity and low
res ponsib ility - form er vice pres ident subj ec ts. The
signifi ca nt interac ti on is s imil ar to wa s reported by Staw
in 1976 between respons ib ility and feedbac k (F ( I , 254) =
6.527, p. = .0 I I ). Hi gh respon ·ibility subjects esca lated

MS
I 06.99
3
353.675
110.3
16.9 10

----

F

S ig nifi ca nce

6.327
20.98 15
1
6.527

.0 13
.000
.0 11

-------

-------

more than low responsibili ty-former vice pres ident
subj ec ts but onl y in th e negati ve feedback conditi on. Thi s
repli ca tes Staw' s ma1n find in g from 1976 under
conditi on s and ins'ructions of the current experiment.
Tab le 4 gives th e res ults o f compa rin g hi gh responsibi li ty
subj ec ts to low responsibility -tea mmate subj ects.

Table 4: High R espo nsibility with Low Res pon sibility-Teamma te S ubj ects
Summary Analys is ofVwi ancc (2 X 2 Factori al) n = 25 6
So ur-ce
Rc, pon,ihilit y
Feedback
Two \ Vay :n
lnh
u:lio u
Rc>idu a l
T otal

ss

nF

57 191
7 18 9 10
6 250
4090 ()~()

I

I\ IS
57 191
7 18.9 10

I

252
255

F

S ignifi canCl'

3.5 24
446.250
29-1
.385

062

.

000

535

16.230

responsibility-tea mmate subj ects who are induced to
frame as recoverin g losses . Ta ble 4 shows the interacti on
between respo nsibility and fe edback is not signifi ca nt (F
( I , 254) = .385, p. = .535) a fter framin g is held constant.
Tab le 5 below pro vid e res ults co mparin g the two low
responsibil ity groups at positive and nega ti ve feedba ck.

Tab le 4 shows high responsib ilit y subjects h:lVe not
esca lated more than low respo nsibil ity- teammate subj ec ts
a fter remov in g fram in g d iflcrcnccs whi ch con fir ms
hypothes is 2. The signifi ca nt interac ti on ear li er observed
between hi gh responsibi lity and low respon sibility former vtce pres id ent
ubjects di sa ppea rs 111 low

Tab le 5: Low R es ponsibility-T ea mma te wit h Low Respo nsibilit y-Former V P
S ummary Ana lysis of Va rian ce (2 X 2 Facto rial) n = 256

ss
S ou rei'
7.735
lh·;po n>ihilit y
265 S•>-1
Frt·dha (·k
64 . 100
Twn Way lnlnac ti n n
16.048-10-14 140
Hcsi tlual
T utal

ll F

F
.4 82
16.568
3.90-1

Signifi
' cant(

488
.000
0-1

2)2
255

subj ec ts ( F ( I , 25-+) = 3. 99-+ , p.
.04 7). Low
rcsponsibi I it y- tea mma te subj eels esca late more than low
responsibi li ty-fo rmer vice presid ent subj ec ts, but onl y in
th e nega ti ve feedback conditi on.

ni
ll ypothcs is 3 1s co nfirm ed. Table 5 shows
ca
a
S PONS
1LIT
REY
II3
an d
si).!.' fi nt interaction between
F ~ EDI3i\CK when comparin g low responsibi
mer
ty- f li
or
\' icc pres ident subj ec ts with low respons ibilit y- tea mm ate
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MS
7.735
265 89-1
647 100
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Low responsibility subjects induced to frame as
recovenng from a teammate 's losses were more
committed to their teammate 's earli er decision than were
low responsibility subj ects who be li eved a fom1er vice
president made those deci sion s, but onl y in the negative
feedback condition . Thi s result cannot be explained by
self-justification since there is no personal responsibility
for the earlier decision by either gro up . It is however
predicted by prospect theory because differing deci sion
frames are used by the two groups relati ve to initi al
wealth state.

fin dings ra ise interestin g questions about self-just ificat ion
as the expl anation for esca lation in the present context.
Some may cri tic ize our tests for relying on a
hypoth etica l deci sion case with student subjects rather
than real world events and decision-makers. Artificia li ty
has long been a va li d criticism of laboratory research . We
mu st note however that nea rl y a ll ex isting esca lation
research includin g Staw ' s seminal 1976 study is based on
these same artificial contexts . Furthermore, it was the A
& S Financial Decision Case outcome that Staw used as
the bas is for concluding (without sufficient evidence in
o ur view) that self-j ustification motivates esca lating
commitment to fa iling courses of action. This inferenc e
has remain ed large ly untested and is not well supported
wi th unambi guous empiri cal evidence.
Whyte q uestioned Staw 's inference of selfjustifi catio n on a theoretical basis and suggested prospect
theory is a more parsimoni ous explanation. We ha ve
presented here modest empiri cal evidence within the
same experimental settin g suggesting se lf-justification
theory is inconsistent with the esca lation behaviors
observed . T he data show, after e li minating fram in g
differences as a confound , self-justification no longer
predicts what occ urs in the context tested .
In an
ad mittedly artificia l and narrow context of the A & S
Financial Deci sion Case, prospect theory better ex pl ain s
what ha s been observed.
Add itional ev idence is needed of course, and in more
compellin g and less artificia l dec ision settin gs before
fina l co nclusions can be drawn abo ut the efficacy of selfj ustifi ca ti o n as a pa11 ia l cause fo r esca lation. In stronger,
more reali stic deci sion contexts with stronger ego
in vo lve ment, perhaps se lf-j ustifi cation can provid e a
s ignifi cant in rlependent motivation for escalation. T estin g
of thi s type need not be limited to busin ess and financia l
contexts but should be broadened to explore other
continuin g deci sions in area s such as medica l deci sionmaking or political deci sion-making. H owever, unti l
empirical ev idence is free of the framin g confound
common to most exi sting esca lati on research is available ,
se lf-ju stification rem a in s in our view a speculati ve,
untested and perhaps inaccu rate ex pl anat ion fo r
esca lation behavior .
Fin ally, we have not intended thi s ev idence to be final
and conclusive that self-justifi cati on is not a viabl e so urce
of esca lati ng comm itment. No sin g le study and certainl y
not one as nano w and artifi c ial as thi s co uld do that.
What we have attempted to do is rai se interestin g
qu esti ons about the nature of the esca lation beha vio rs
fi rst observed by Staw in the contex t of the A & S
Fi nanc ial Deci sion Case, and more important ly ra ise

Implications and Discussion
Escalation m financi al dec ision-makin g is a
potentially di sastrous dec ision-maki ng phenomenon . For
researchers, a starting pla ce must be to understand why
escalation occurs. Making correct assumpti ons about the
causes of esca lation is a crucial first step towards
predicting its occwTence and di scovering approaches for
mitigating its costs . We believe by better understandin g
the theoretical underpinnings of esca lati on, the likelihood
of making research progress towards its miti gati on w ill
be improved. A correct theoretical understanding of
escalation causes affects the sorts of research questi ons
asked, affects research designs employed to resolve those
questions, and ultimately shapes the real-vvorld soluti ons
developed to address the probl em.
If it is true that escalation is th e consequence of
se lf-justifi cation of past action s, then strategies to contTo l
the ego invo lvement of dec ision makers in continuin g
deci sions are necessa ry . On th e other hand , if esca lation
is only an artifact of dec ision framing, then stTategies
whi ch ensure carefu l and expli cit awa reness of th e
potential for decision fra me bias be used.
Results reported here see m full y co nsistent with
Whyte's prospect theory in terpretation of esca latin g
commitment (Whyte, 1986). Ou r tests were made within
the context of Staw ' s A & S Fin ancia l Deci s ion Case and
though they suppot1 a prospec t theory interpreta tion , they
are not consistent with a se lf-ju sti ficatio n theory
interpretation.
Seem in gly, esca lation behaviors very
similar to those observed by Staw no longer occur if low
respon sibili ty subj ects are induced to frame simil arl y to
hi gh
respon sibility
subj ects.
Furth em1ore,
low
responsibi lity subj ects induced to frame as recove rin g
losses esca late more th an low respon sibi lity subj ects who
Th ese
ha ve fram ed as preservin g initi al wea lth .
di ffe rences in esca lation behav ior ca nn ot be ex pl ained as
se lf-justification since neither group had any persona l
responsibili ty for the earli er deci sion s. Together o ur
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questi ons abo ut the inferences dra wn from them. A lon g
stTeam of research has fo ll owed Sta w th at assumes sel !j ustifi cation is the major cause of esca lati on. ln our
op ini on , too littl e empiri ca l scrutiny ha s been give n to
thi s assumpti on.
ln conc lusion, we ha ve asked and attempted to answer
the questi on: do observed escalation behaviors support or
contradi ct se l f-j usti fi cati on theory as an exp lanati on for
escalatin g commitment after removi ng framin g
d iffe rences as a confound ? In th e contex t of Staw' s 1976
A & S Financial Decision Case (w ith an expanded
des ign), we find that prospect theory better fi ts observed
esca lati on beha viors than sel f-j usti fication theory.
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